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South Africa’s Land 
Reform Crisis
Eliminating the Legacy of Apartheid
Bernadette Atuahene
Under colonialism and apartheid, the ruling white minority
stole vast amounts of land from black Africans in Zimbabwe and
South Africa. Reclaiming this land became an important rallying
cry for liberation movements in both countries; but in the years
after white minority rule ended, it was extremely di⁄cult for the
new regimes to redistribute the land fairly and e⁄ciently. In recent
years, as the unaddressed land inequality in Zimbabwe became a
pretext for President Robert Mugabe’s demagoguery and led to
Zimbabwe’s demise, many observers have asked: Could South Africa
be next?
When Nelson Mandela took power in South Africa in 1994, 87 per-
cent of the country’s land was owned by whites, even though they
represented less than ten percent of the population. Advised by the
World Bank, the ruling African National Congress (anc) aimed
to redistribute 30 percent of the land from whites to blacks in the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the new democracy. By 2010—16 years later—
only eight percent had been reallocated.
In failing to redistribute this land, the anc has undermined a crucial
aspect of the negotiated settlement to end apartheid, otherwise known
as the liberation bargain. According to Section 25 of the new South
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African constitution, promulgated in 1994, existing property owners
(who were primarily white) would receive valid legal title to property
acquired under prior regimes, despite the potentially dubious cir-
cumstances of its acquisition. In exchange, blacks (in South Africa,
considered to include people of mixed racial descent and Indians)
were promised land reform. But the new government upheld only
one side of the liberation bargain: South African whites kept their
property, but blacks still have not received theirs. Political apartheid
may have ended, but economic apartheid lives on.
this land is our land
South Africa’s failure to rectify its land inequality is like a sea of
oil waiting for a match. In one of the most impressive public opinion
studies ever conducted in the country, in 2009 the political scientist
James Gibson surveyed 3,700 South Africans and found that 85 per-
cent of black respondents believed that “most land in South Africa
was taken unfairly by white settlers, and they therefore have no right
to the land today.” Only eight percent of white respondents held the
same view. Gibson’s most alarming ﬁnding was that two of every
three of these blacks agreed that “land must be returned to blacks in
South Africa, no matter what the consequences are for the current
owners and for political stability in the country”; 91 percent of the
whites surveyed disagreed.
According to Gibson’s data, most blacks, whether they live in
rural or urban areas, see the land as stolen and want it back even if
redistribution will provoke political unrest. In spite of these ﬁndings,
not everyone expects instability to actually materialize, because
land inequality in South Africa does not aªect livelihoods as it did
in Zimbabwe. For example, only about three percent of South
Africa’s gdp is based on agriculture, whereas before the 2000 land
grabs in Zimbabwe, agriculture contributed about 20 percent of
that country’s gdp.
Such optimism overlooks two important considerations, however.
First, although agriculture does not contribute signiﬁcantly to South
Africa’s gdp, about 35–40 percent of the nation’s population resides in
rural areas, so access to land is necessary for the survival of many poor
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families. Second, unlike other complex social issues in South Africa
(such as unemployment and inadequate health care), land inequality
has roots that are easy for South Africa’s
majority to understand. The refrain that
“whites stole our land and now we deserve
to get it back” is a simple yet rhetorically
powerful one that resonates among margin-
alized, poor populations in both rural and
urban areas.Theft of land has come to sym-
bolize the more extensive theft of wealth that
occurred under colonialism and apartheid.
It is possible that one day a charismatic
populist leader could use the land issue to
rally the vast army of poor and frustrated black citizens from both
rural and urban areas to reclaim the stolen wealth, making the focal
point all whites and not, as in Zimbabwe, primarily white farmers.
Yet instead of equitably redistributing land, the anc has under-
funded land reform eªorts, implemented Section 25 of the constitution
in a way that reinforces inequalities between the races, and failed to
assist the beneﬁciaries of the land reform in obtaining the capital and
skills necessary to use their newly acquired land productively.
According to South African President Jacob Zuma, land reform
ranks at the top of the anc’s agenda. In 2009, Zuma said, “During the
election campaign, we made it clear that rural development and land
reform would be one of our key ﬁve priorities.” And in an April 2011
speech, he declared, “We are committed to seeing that those commu-
nities that were wrongfully evicted during the apartheid era receive
just compensation for their loss. Our aim here is to ensure that poverty
alleviation goes hand in hand with the return of land.”
But Zuma has failed to put his money where his mouth is. In 2010,
the Land Restitution Commission, an agency pivotal to the land
reform eªorts, placed a moratorium on buying land claimed under
the restitution program because it had run out of money to honor
those sales agreements it had already entered into with landowners.
The commission asked the South African Treasury for 5.3 billion rand
(approximately $757 million), partly to honor outstanding commit-
ments to landowners, but it was allocated only 1.9 billion rand (about
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$271 million). This has led several landowners to sue the commission
for failing to honor its sales agreements. Even worse, it has sent the
message that the anc is not serious about land reform.
reinforcing inequalities
In the process of trying to remedy inequality, the anc has instead
exacerbated it.The apartheid government often took land from black
communities without just compensation and transferred it at nomi-
nal cost to white farmers. If the anc decides to return a particular par-
cel of land to a dispossessed black community while the white farmer
to whom the apartheid government sold it is still alive, the state
is constitutionally mandated to pay the farmer just compensation,
despite the unfair circumstances under which the farmer acquired the
land in the ﬁrst place. Yet blacks do not get just compensation for land
previous governments stole from them. The constitution states that
South Africans whose property was dispossessed after 1913 as a result
of racially discriminatory business practices are entitled “either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” By 2008, however,
70 percent of the beneﬁciaries of the land restitution program had
received no land at all, only small, symbolic ﬁnancial awards that bore
no relation to the past or current market value of their conﬁscated
property. This is not equitable redress.
For instance, the Land Restitution Commission paid each dis-
possessed landowner in Paarl, a scenic town in the Western Cape’s
wine country, 40,000 rand (about $5,700), whereas it paid six current
landowners in the same province 14.5 million rand (about $2 million) for
about 250 acres of land. From its inception in 1995 through March 2008,
the commission spent 7.8 billion rand (about $1.1 billion) to acquire
property for land reform, which was paid mostly to white farmers, but
only 4.9 billion rand (approximately $700 million) to distribute as ﬁnan-
cial compensation, which was paid primarily to dispossessed blacks.
Such disparities only reinforce apartheid-era inequalities. To be sure,
the South African government has a limited budget and many other
important priorities, such as health care and education. But if the state
cannot aªord to give both blacks and whites just compensation, then
both blacks and whites should receive only symbolic compensation.
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Another problem with the land restitution process is the commis-
sion’s failure to follow Section 25(3) of the constitution, a provision
deftly negotiated by the anc to ensure land reform is fair for both
blacks and whites. This provision requires the state to compensate
present landowners based on fair market
value but also to reduce the price paid based
on several equity-enhancing factors, such
as direct state investment and subsidies for
acquisition and capital improvements on the
property. If, for example, a white farmer
acquired land from the apartheid govern-
ment at a greatly reduced price but then made
capital improvements to the land, then when
that land is expropriated, the postapartheid state is required to pay
the farmer fair market value for the capital improvements but can
discount the underlying land because it was not acquired at market
price. Yet according to a recent interview given by Thozi Gwanya,
former director general of the Department of Rural Development
and Land Reform, when the commission acquires land from willing
sellers, it pays the fair market value without discounting the price
based on the equity-enhancing factors. Gwanya noted that the com-
mission does not even research the factors to allow it to negotiate a
just price.
The problem is compounded further by the fact that when the
government does redistribute land, it does not give new landowners
the support they need to succeed. Poor black farmers require ﬁnancial
and technical support to access markets, credit, technology, infra-
structure, and training. But as research conducted by the Program for
Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape has
shown, the state routinely fails to give newly resettled communities
even the basic irrigation tools and electricity resources they need.
The state instead gives large, resource-poor communities land that
was formerly used by single farmers for large-scale, capital-intensive
commercial agriculture. This is a recipe for disaster.
Providing resettled communities with access to capital, infrastruc-
ture, and the training necessary to take over a commercial agricultural
enterprise requires a signiﬁcant investment of state resources. A
South Africa’s Land Reform Crisis
foreign affairs . July /August 2011 [ 125 ]
The ANC must realize
that aggressive land 
reform would be far less
destabilizing than a 
violent revolt.
less costly alternative would be for the state to abandon the idea of
redistributing capital-intensive agribusinesses and give communities
land for subsistence farming, which can be done without signiﬁcant
government intervention. The dream of seamlessly transferring a
thriving citrus farm, for example, from a white farmer to a black
community is dead. The state must accept this and begin to look for
new solutions.
no opposition, no reform
The anc’s failure to address the needs of its political base by allocating
more funding for land reform, giving equitable compensation, and
providing support for new landowners strikes many political observers
as puzzling. But the government can aªord this failure because the
short-term political costs of inaction are low. The anc totally domi-
nates South African politics, so it faces no real competition for its
constituents’ votes. It controls 66 percent of the National Assembly,
eight of the country’s nine provinces, and ﬁve of the six big-city
governments. During the last election, in 2009, there was hope that
the Congress of the People (cope), a party started by breakaway anc
members opposed to Zuma, would provide a viable alternative, but
cope only managed to secure eight percent of the seats in the National
Assembly and has since eªectively dissolved. There is no one to
punish the anc if it fails to deliver on land reform.
The danger, however, is that over time, leaders within the anc
who advocate radical land reform policies will become increasingly
powerful and, for personal or political purposes, will encourage the
party to exploit the issue just as Mugabe and his zanu-pf (Zimbabwe
African National Union–Patriotic Front) did in Zimbabwe. In fact,
last year, Julius Malema, the controversial yet popular president of the
anc Youth League, visited Zimbabwe and lauded “Comrade Bob”
for successfully returning much of that country’s farmland to its
“rightful owners.” Malema said, “In SA we are just starting. Here
in Zimbabwe you are already very far. The land question has been
addressed. We are very happy that today you can account for more
than 300,000 new farmers against the 4,000 who used to dominate
agriculture.” For the moment, Malema and his like-minded comrades
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remain at the fringe of the anc, and the party has no need to rely on
manipulative populist tactics. But both things could change.
Moreover, although the anc may be politically invulnerable
now, it is not economically invulnerable; indeed, it relies on cap-
ital from white South Africans and foreign investors to maintain
economic growth. If the anc pursues policies that alienate these
sources of capital, there could be disastrous economic conse-
quences. This is a lesson the party learned early on. In his book
Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, the South African
journalist William Gumede notes that shortly after his release
from Robben Island, Mandela attended a private lunch with
prominent businesspeople where he said that only nationalization
could address the inequalities created by apartheid. Soon thereafter,
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s all-gold index plunged, falling
by ﬁve percent.
Thus, Mandela changed his tune, telling business leaders in Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, in 1991, “Let me assure you that the anc is not
an enemy of private enterprise. . . . We are aware that the investor will
not invest unless the security of that investment is assured. The rates
of economic growth we seek cannot be achieved without important
inﬂows of foreign capital. We are determined to create the necessary
climate that the foreign investor will ﬁnd attractive.” The anc’s fear
of upsetting markets and alienating its sources of capital explains the
disparities in the compensation for property paid to current owners (who
are mostly white) and the compensation for dispossessed owners
(who are mostly black).
Markets may indeed react adversely if the anc moves away from
its policy of purchasing land at market prices from willing sellers
and adopts a more aggressive land reform policy that relies on court-
based expropriation consistent with Section 25(3) of the constitution.
But proceeding slowly on the grounds that some justice must be
sacriﬁced for the sake of stability risks creating major political turmoil
down the road. If nothing is done to correct the fact that whites
presently own about 77 percent of the land while constituting less
than ten percent of the population, unrest could result.The anc must
realize that aggressive land reform would be far less destabilizing
than a violent revolt.
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making land reform work
The international community has also been slow to help out,
despite the potential explosiveness of the issue. Gwanya, the former
director general of the Department of Rural Development and
Land Reform; Judge Fikile Bam, president of the Land Claims
Court; and Blessing Mphela, former chief land claims commis-
sioner, have all agreed that the primary obstacles to achieving the
government’s land reform objectives are bureaucratic inexperience,
ineªective policies, and organizational ine⁄ciency.
The example of the Popela community in the northern Limpopo
Province is a case in point. The Popela community is resource poor,
and its land rights were progressively eroded under colonialism and
apartheid. The community had full rights to use its ancestral land
until 1889, when the British expropriated it and gave title to a white
settler who forced community members to provide free labor if they
wanted to remain there. In 1969, the community was stripped of all
its formal rights to use the land. In a landmark decision delivered
in June 2007, the South African Constitutional Court ruled that
certain community members were entitled to restitution of their land
rights. Four years later, however, the Land Restitution Commission,
which was charged with implementing the court’s decision, has yet
to purchase the land as mandated by the court.
According to the o⁄cial managing the case, there are several
reasons for the long delay. One has to do with problems getting
land valuations and obtaining various approvals. In addition, because
of the commission’s failure to spend money allocated for prior projects,
it could not get additional money from the national budget for new
projects (including the Popela claim), and it is prohibited from
transferring monies allocated for old projects to new ones. The net
result is that the Popela community has been forced to pay the
price for bureaucratic incompetence and rigid regulation.
The international community could help South Africa address
these deﬁciencies.The country’s government o⁄cials are well aware
of the lack of coordination between relevant agencies, ineªective
procedures, and ine⁄cient processes that are hampering the land
reform program, but they do not know how to solve these problems.
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They need the help of consultants with experience in evaluating
dysfunctional government agencies and providing viable solutions.
Senior government o⁄cials leading the land reform eªorts would also
beneﬁt from a well-crafted, donor-funded international exchange
program that allowed them to study past land reforms in Brazil,
South Korea, Taiwan, and several eastern European nations with
relevant experiences. Furthermore, those bureaucrats serving as the
foot soldiers would beneﬁt from intensive training programs focused
on how to most eªectively implement existing policies. The inter-
national community could fund international experts to develop a
series of courses designed to give these bureaucrats the skills they
need to succeed. The anc would undoubtedly welcome these inter-
ventions because the assistance would not involve more aggressive
policy changes that could cause markets to react adversely; instead, the
assistance would ensure that the existing programs were run more
e⁄ciently and eªectively.
Whatever policies the anc adopts, the bottom line is that land
reform in South Africa must move quicker and more e⁄ciently.
Thus far, South African citizens have waited patiently for the anc
to transfer land from whites to blacks to remedy the massive land
theft that happened under colonialism and apartheid. But without
signiﬁcant progress, there may come a point when these citizens
will tire of waiting and take matters into their own hands.The outside
world played a signiﬁcant role in helping bring about a democratic
South Africa; it should once again lend a hand to put the legacy of
apartheid to rest at last.∂
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